

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 11, 2014

**MEMO TO:** Steven Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending July 11, 2014

**Electro-Static Dissipative (ESD) Flooring:** This week, the Site Representative observed Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) system engineering personnel perform spot checks on a newly poured ESD floor covering that failed the initial acceptance testing. The last acceptance test failure was in September 2013. Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Pantex, LLC (B&W) had installed five new ESD floors since then without a failure. The acceptance test measures the resistance between the floor surface and a facility ground. The resistance must be less than 100 mega-ohms. There were at least 150 locations on the floor where the resistance exceeded 100 mega-ohms. The CNS system engineers allow a one-week cure time between the time the top coat is poured and the acceptance test is performed. In the past, B&W and their subcontractor had extended the one-week cure time and found that regions of the floor came into compliance as it cured further. CNS and the subcontractor are still evaluating the cause of the failure but CNS plans to proceed with recoating the floor.

**Emergency Lighting Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO):** CNS entered the LCO for inoperable emergency lights in one nuclear explosive operating facility. The last time this LCO was entered, for a different facility, it took approximately ten days to exit the LCO. (See report for 5/30/2014.) CNS repaired the emergency lights and exited the LCO within seven hours.

**Blast Door Interlock LCO:** CNS entered the LCO for an inoperable blast door interlock system in one nuclear explosive operating facility. CNS has implemented an administrative control to ensure that one set of personnel and equipment doors are closed at all times, as required by the LCO.

**Pause of Nuclear Explosive Operations:** CNS paused nuclear explosive operations in three individual facilities for three different reasons. In the first event, Production Technicians (PTs) were not able to complete the step in the Nuclear Explosive Operating Procedure (NEOP) due to an issue with the insertion stand. The tooling engineers have seen this problem on previous revisions of the insertion stand, but this is the first time it has appeared on the latest revision of the stand. CNS has written a Nuclear Explosives Engineering Procedure (NEEP) to resume operations with the existing insertion stand. In the second event, the PTs were performing a detonator cable assembly installation and noticed that the gage used to measure component dimensions was giving anomalous readings. CNS has written a NEEP to repair the gage. In the third event, PTs noticed a stripped screw on an antenna. This has occurred in the past, and there is an existing NEEP to remove the stripped screw.

**NNSA Production Office (NPO) Duty Officer Program:** NPO has abolished the facility representative (FR) duty officer position and initiated a Management Duty Officer (MDO) position. The primary change is that the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) will only notify the MDO for the most significant events in the Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) order; however the PSS will still notify the FRs (and DNFSB Site Representative) by pager for all ORPS reportable events. This change was made to provide the notification of significant events directly to the NPO executive leadership team instead of through the FRs.